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THE NEW UNITED STATES PATENT ACT IN THE
LIGHT OF COMPARATIVE LAW I*
Stefan A. Riesenfeld i
GENESIS AND GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE PATENT LAW REVISION

On January 1, 1953 the New Patent Act of the United States
went into effect.' The recent first anniversary of this legislation thus
makes it appropriate to reassess its principal accomplishments and
make a first attempt at taking stock of unfulfilled expectations and
first signs of defects.
The enactment of the new statute constituted the culmination of
protracted efforts towards a revision and recodification of the patent
law, a movement which had come into existence at the beginning of
the Thirties,2 if not before, and entered into an acute stage in the year
* This is the first of two articles dealing with the new Patent Act. In a subsequent article Mr. Riesenfeld will discuss the changes in patent procedure before the
Patent Office and in the courts. Ed.

t LL.B., University of California, S.J.D., Harvard University; Professor of Law,
University of California; Author of THE LAW OF MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANIES
(in German 1933), PROTECTION OF COASTAL FISHERIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1942), MODERN SOCIAL LEGISLATION (1951).
1. 66 STAT. 792, 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 1 et seq. (Supp. 1952).
2: Of course it is impossible to ascribe a definite date of origin to the demands
for a revision which were voiced by various groups of both industry and the legal
profession. But it may be mentioned that as early as 1932 the Committee on Patents
of the House of Representatives held hearings on a general patent law revision,
Hearings before Committee on Patents, House of Representatives, on General Revision of Patent Laws, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932).
Further impetus was given
to the movement for a modernization of the patent laws by the Roosevelt Administration. The Temporary National Emergency Committee, which was established in
1938 to study economic concentration in the United States, drew the patent system
into the ambit of its investigations and, among other activities in that respect, caused
Professor Hamilton to produce a study which was subsquently published. HAMILTON,
PATENTS AND FRE ENTERPRISE (TNEC Monograph 31, 1941). In 1941, President
Roosevelt, by Executive Order No. 8977, 3 CODE FED. R-Es. 316 (Supp. 1941),
(291)
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1949.' The new code represents the fifth codification of the American
patent law which commenced with the Patent Act of April 10, 1790."
This statute, which predicated the grant of a patent upon an examination by a special board as to the usefulness and importance of the
invention and thus was a forerunner of the modern system,' had only a
short-lived existence. It was superseded by another patent act of
1793 6 which adhered to the so-called "registration principle." The
next general patent law revision took place in 1836. The statute of
that year 7 re-established the examination principle and, generally speaking, originated the system presently in operation.' The act remained
in force until a complete revision was enacted in 1870.' When in 1874
the federal laws were subjected to a general revision and consolidation,1" the patent law was included in the new statute book without
established the National Patent Planning Committee consisting of five members with
the task of conducting a comprehensive survey and study of the American patent system. In execution of this charge, the committee published three reports on fundamental problems of its field of inquiry. The American Patent System, H.R. Misc.
Doc. No. 239, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943); Government-Owned Patents on Inventions of Government Employees and Contractors, H.R. Doc. Misc. No. 22, 79th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1945) ; Third Report on the American Patent System, H.R. Doc.
Misc. No. 283, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945). However, the creation of a new committee
by the Secretary of Commerce, following a directive of the President, issued in
April, 1945, terminated the work of the commission, before its final completion.
3. In that year it was suggested that, since the Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, had jurisdiction over both the revision of laws and the
subject of patents and had entrusted the discharge of these functions to the same
subcommittee, the committee should undertake the preparation of a bill to revise the
patent laws. The committee took up this suggestion and prepared, and published
early in 1950, a preliminary draft of a "Proposed Revision and Amendment of the
Patent Laws" (1950). After the receipt of comments and criticisms from interested
groups and agencies a bill to revise and codify the patent laws was drafted and
introduced in Congress during the summer of 1950. H.R. 9133, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1950). After the solicitation of further comments a revised bill was reintroduced
in the. following year. H.R. 3760, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951). The subcommittee
in charge of the matter held extensive hearings on the bill during June, 1951, Hearings before Subcommittee No. 3 of the Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 3760,
82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951). As a result of these hearings the bill was again modified and introduced. H.R. 7794, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952). This bill was passed
by the Congress as Pub. L. No. 593, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (July 19, 1952). See the
legislative history outlined in H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
The Commitee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, submitted an illuminating
report to accompany H.R. 7794 which explained the principal features and objects
of the bill and contained detailed "Revision Notes" in an appendix, H.R. REF. No.
1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952). The Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, incorporated the House Report in toto with some slight changes in the introduction,
SEN. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
4. 1 STAT. 109 (1790).
5. For an interesting survey of the evolution of the American patent law, see
THE STORY OF THE AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM 1790-1952 (U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
Patent Office, 1953).

6. 1 STAT. 318 (1793).
7. 5 STAT. 117 (1836).
8. But see, CENTENNIAL CELEBRATION OF THE AmuIcAx PATENT SYSTEM, 18361936 (U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Patent Office. 1936) ; THE STORY OF THE AmRICAN
PATENT SYSTEM 1790-1952 6 (U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Patent Office, 1953).
9. 16 STAT. 198 (1870).

10. REv.

STAT.

(1875).
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changes, although it was distributed over several chapters." In the
course of time advances in technology necessitated a multitude of
amendments and additions which gradually rendered the law cumbersome and in some ways inconsistent. The revisions and codification
of 1952, therefore, satisfied a strongly felt need.
The American patent law reform of 1952 is the third of the recent
four great patent law revisions in the Anglo-American legal systems.
In 1949,12 the United Kingdom completed its revision which had
commenced shortly before the end of the Second World War."3 The
new South African Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to
patents 14 was signed in 1952, a few weeks prior to the approval of
the American statute. In the same year, shortly after the United States
completed its new code, Australia finished her revision which had been
As might perhaps have been exinitiated in the middle Thirties.'
pected, the reforms in the United States, as well as those in the United
Kingdom and Australia, introduced no revolutionary changes; although
they took account of certain modern trends and made numerous and,
in some instances, far reaching amendments. They remained considerably less radical than the socialistic arrangements established in
the U.S.S.R.,'" Czechoslovakia, 17 and the so-called German Democratic Republic.'
It must be admitted, however, that the reforms in
11. REv. STAT. tit. XI, c. 6, tit. LX, cc. 1-3 (1875).
12. U.K. Patents Act, 1949, 12, 13 and 14 Gzo. 6, c. 87.
13. The English patent law reform started with the appointment of the Patent
Law Reform Committee by the Board of Trade in 1944. This committee published
two Interim Reports and one Final Report, CUD. No. 6618 (1945) ; CMD. No. 6789
(1946); and CaiD. No. 7206,(1947).
14. South African Patents Act, No. 37 of 1952, [1952] STATUTES OF THE UNION
OF SOUTH AFRIcA 199.
15. Australian Patents Act 1952 (No. 42 of 1952) assented to Sept. 27th, 1952.
The statute is reprinted in 51 PAT. & T.M. Ray. 198, 224, 257, 290 (19 3). About
the history of the Australian patent law reform, see The Patents Act 1952, 27 AusT.
L.J. 2 (1953). The reform began in 1935 with the appointment by the AttorneyGeneral of a committee to revise the Patent Law of the Commonwealth.
16. For a translation and brief discussion of the Russian Act concerning inventions and technical improvements see Prince, The New Soviet Patent Law, 28
J. PAT. OFF. Sody 261 (1946); for a summary see WHITE AND RAVENSCROFT,
PATENTs THROUGHOUT THE WORLD 305 (2d ed. 1952). The Russian law gives the
inventor the choice between a patent in the traditional sense and an author's certificate which entitles recipient to a remuneration from the state and to certain other
privileges.
17. See Czechoslovakia, Inventions and Innovations Act 1952, 51 PAT. & T.M.
REv. 127 (1953).
18. See Nathan, Das ieue Patentrecht der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik,
4 NEuE JusTiz 430 (1950) ; for an English summary see Beil, The Patent Law of the
German Democratic Republic, 33 J. PAT. OFF. Soc' 685 (1951). The East German
law follows the alternative systemj established in the U.S.S.R.
It may also be noted in this connection that the German patent law has traditionally contained a provision prescribing that: "The effects of patents shall be limited
so far as is necessary if the government decrees that the invention be exploited
in the ihterest of the public welfare." In such case the patent owner is entitled to
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both the United States and Australia remained considerably more
conservative than those in the United Kingdom. 9 The new patent
law in the United States in particular was designed to strengthen
rather than to curtail the rights of the patent owner. It may perhaps
still be recalled that shortly before the outbreak of World War II the
American patent system had become the storm center of a violent
controversy over economic policies and that, like Helena in Goethe's
20
Faust, it formed the object of much praise and of much censure.
However, the National Patent Planning Commission which investigated the operation of the American Patent law between the years
1943 and 1945,21 gave the existing system a clean bill of health and
recommended, unequivocally and rather boastfully, the retention of
its major features:
"The system has accomplished all that the framers of the
Constitution intended..
The basic principles of the present system should be
preserved. The system has contributed to the growth and greatness of our Nation.
.. . [A]fter careful study, the Commission has reached
the conclusion that the American system is the best in the world.
just compensation, Patent Act of the German Federal Republic of May 5, 1936,
§ 8, as revised by statute of July 18, 1953, R.G. BL pt. I, 615. The nature of this
limitation has been characterized by the German Supreme Court and the text-writers
as a "special type of compulsory license." See 1 REImER, PATENTGESETZ UND
GEsETz BETREFFEND DEN SCHUTZ VON GEBRAucHssusTERN 370 (1949).
19. The Australian patent law reform followed generally the recommendations
of the United Kingdom Committee and adopted in substance the provisions of the
1949 British Act. The Australian revision committee, however, rejected, among
other matters, the provisions of the British Act which empower the Comptroller
to revoke a patent within twelve months from its grant upon application of a third
party and after an administrative hearing. It also refused to adopt the elaborate
catalogue of grounds upon which the Comptroller is authorized to grant "licenses
of right," or to revoke the patent. U.K. Patents Act, 1949, 12, 13 and 14 GEo. 6,
c. 87, §§ 33, 37, 39, 41, 42. See The Patents Act 1952, 27 AusT. L.J. 2, 6 (1953).
20. Professor Walton Hamilton of the Yale University Law School voiced
perhaps the most severe and influential criticism of the American patent system as
a source of abuses in his T.N.E.C. Monograph. He summarized his findings in the
following sentences: "Thus it has come about that a patent is harnessed to causes
it was never meant to serve. It may be used as a shield against public policy, as an
immunity to the general law. It may be employed to exempt concerns from the
rule of the market and the severities of the rivalry for trade. . .
In such employment a wayward patent system has strayed far from the office to which it was
appointed by the Constitution." HAMILTON, PATENTS AND FREE ENTERPRISE 162
(TNEC Monograph 31, 1941). Professor Hamilton's views met violent opposition
in FOLK, PATENTS AND INDUSTRIAL PROGRESS (1942). Of more recent discussions
of the working of the patent systems in the United States and Canada mention
should be made of BENNETT, THE AMERicAN PATENT SYSTEM (1943); DREwS, THE
PATENT RIGHT IN THE NATIONAL EcONomY OF THE UNITED STATES (1952); Fox,
MONOPOLIES AND PATENTS, A STUDY Or THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF THE PATENT
M ooNLY (1947).
21. See note 2 sis pra. Members of the Commission were Charles T. Ketterihg,

Chester C. Davis, Francis P. Gaines, Edward F. McGrady and Owen D. Young.
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. . . The American patent system should be adjusted to meet

existing conditions without destroying its basic principles."

22

Similar, though perhaps somewhat more restrained views were advanced by the British departmental Patent Law Reform Committee: 28
"We are in favour of the retention of the present system
in this country, and this view is supported by witnesses who have
appeared before us, representing both inventors and the commercial users of inventions. .

.

. Although we favour the retention

of the present system and the general frame of the existing patent
law, we believe that there are several respects in which it can be
improved." 24

The new American, British, Australian and South African patent
laws thus not only have preserved the traditional system of a private,
exclusive and transferable right of limited duration for the benefit of
the inventor; they also have remained members of the great family of
laws which adhere to the so-called examination system, that is,
predicate the patent grant upon a successful examination on the merits
by an administrative agency. In this latter respect the four
patent laws mentioned are related to those of some other important
industrial nations, primarily the German Federal Republic, 25 but
stand in sharp contrast to those of France, 26 Italy," and Switzerland.2 8 As mentioned before, the examination system had been intro22. National Patent Planning Commission, The American Patent System, H.R.
Misc. Doc. No. 239, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1943).
23. On the appointment of this Committee, see note 12 rupra.
24. Patents and Designs Acts, Second Interim Report of the Departmental Committee (CmD. No. 6789 at 4 (1946)). The Australian revision committee reported
likewise that the patent law in that country, on the whole, was working satisfactorily
and that it was not necessary to "recommend any radical changes in the existing
system. . .

."

See the summary of the report in The Patents Act 1952, 27 AusT.

L.J. 2 (1953).
25. German Patent Act of 5 May 1936 (R.G.BrL. pt. II, 117), as amended by
acts or decrees of 9 April 1938 (R.G.BL. pt. II, 129), 23 Oct. 1941 (R.G.BL. pt. II,
372), 8 July 1949 (WI.G.BL. 175), 20 Dec. 1951 (B.G.BL. pt. I, 979) and 18
July 1953 (B.G.BL. pt. I, 615).
26. Patent Law of 5 July 1844 (Sirey, Lois Annot es, 2e S~rie 1831-1848, 810)
with numerous subsequent amendments. The act providis in § 11 that "Patents for
which applications are duly made are granted without previous examination at the
risk and danger of the applicants and without guaranty of the novelty or merit of the
invention or the reliability or accuracy of the description." (Italics added.) From
the initial letters of the clause "sans guarantie du gouvernement" systems which
are patterned after the French law are frequently referred to as the S.G.G.-systems.
27. The Italian patent law presently in force is chiefly contained in the Civil
Code of 16 March 1942, §§ 2584 et seq. and the Royal Decree of 29 June 1939, No.
1127, concerning patents for industrial inventions.
28. Federal Patent Law of 21 June 1907, as amended by statutes of 9 Oct. 1926
and 15 May 1929. The present Swiss law does not provide for an examination of
the patent application except as to its compliance with the formal requirements prescribed by the statute and the regulations thereunder and specifies expressly that:
"The patents are granted without guaranty of the existence, utility or novelty of the
invention." (Act of 9 Oct. 1926, § 3) The introduction of the examination system,
however, has been much discussed in recent times, see Etienne, L'examen prialable
des brevets d'invention, Diss. UNIv. oF NEucHATEL

(1950).
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duced in the United States as early as 1790 when the original patent
act was passed.29 The second patent act, however, had soon abandoned
it for the registration method" 0 and it was restored only in 1836
with the passage of the third patent statute.3 1
The most important changes and improvements of the patent law,
in the technical sense, that are accomplished by the new patent code
may perhaps be classified conveniently into four main categories and
discussed in that arrangement, viz., amendments relating to the:
1. objects of, and other substantive conditions for patent protection;
2. content and scope of patent protection;
3. formal requirements for patent protection;
4. enforcement of patent protection.
SUBSTANTIVE PREREQUISITES FOR PATENT PROTECTION

The Constitution 2 vests in the Congress the power ".

.

. To

promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." Obviously every American patent law
must keep within the frame thus circumscribed. Accordingly, Congressional draftsmen and the courts have endeavored traditionally to
define the patentable objects and the other prerequisites for patentability (usefulness, novelty and attainment of the standard of invention)
with reference to the scope of the constitutional authorization. The
new patent code, of course, had to remain within the accepted boundaries, but in many respects it constitutes a significant enlargement of
the previously available area of patent protection.
Enlargement of the Definition of Patentable Objects
The preceding patent law defined the objects of patentable inventions as ".

.

. any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or com-

position of matter, or any new and useful improvements thereof, or
[any] asexually reproduced . . . distinct and new variety of
plant, other than tuber-propagated plant. . . . " ' With the exception

4
of the inclusion of plant patents which were introduced only in 1930,3
29. 1 STAT. 109 (1790).

30. 1 STAT. 318 (1793).
31. 5 STAT. 117 (1836).
32. U.S. CoNsT. Art. I,

§8, cl. 8.

33. 35 U.S.C. §31 (1946).
34. Ibid.
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this somewhat old-fashioned catalogue stemmed from the Patent Act
of 1 7 9 3 .15 That statute in turn had borrowed most of its list from
the slightly different enumeration of patentable inventions contained
in the act of 1790 " which had expanded the single term "manufacture"
defined as the object of permissible patents in the celebrated Statute
of Monopolies of 1623. 8T The Patent Act of 1952 increases the field
of patentable inventions. Section 101 of the new code provides for
patents for ". . . any new and useful process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof..
," " Apart from the omission of the reference to the
asexually reproduced nontuberous plants, patents for which are now
regulated in a special chapter, 9 the only change in the new statutory
catalogue is the replacement of the term "art" by the term "process."
It is, however, important to note that the new act includes a special
definition of the word "process" and provides that: "The term 'process'
means process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known
process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter or material." 40
The substitution of the expression-troika "process, art or method"
in lieu of the single wheel-horse "art" should not amount to an actual
change in the law. It has been recognized since early days that a
"process" or "method" is covered by the statutory term "art." 41
Originally the draftsmen of the new act intended to eliminate completely
the expression "art" from the statutory language since they deemed
it antiquated and misleading.4 But upon protests by representatives
35. 1
36. 1

STAT. 318

STAT. 110

(1793).
(1790).

This statute defined as patentable objects

"...

any

useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement
therein .... "
37. Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 JAC. I, c. 3, § 6. This act authorized the
grant of patents for

"...

the sole Working or Making of any Manner

of

new Manufactures. ..
" For the history and significance of this act, see especially
Fox, MONOPOLIES AND PATENTS, A STUDY OF THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF THE
PATENT MONOPOLY (1947).
38. 66 STAT. 797, 35 U.S.C.A. § 101 (Supp. 1952).
39. 66 STAT. 804, 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 161-164 (Supp. 1952).
40. 66 STAT. 797, 35 U.S.C.A. §100(b) (Supp. 1952).
41. "A process, eo nomine, is not made the subject of a patent in our act of
Congress. It is included under the general term 'useful art.'" Coming v. Burden,
15 How. 252, 267 (U.S. 1853). For other early cases discussing the concept and
statutory authorization of "process patents" as contrasted with products or machine
patents see particularly Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787-88 (1876); Tilghman
v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 722, 728 (1880) ; Fermentation Co. v. Maus, 122 U.S. 413,
427 (1887). See also CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS §§ 9-19 (4th ed.
1873); 1 WALKER, PATENTS 38 et seq. (7th ed., Deller, 1937).
42. See the definition of process as contained in H.R. 3760 § 100(b), 82d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1951), and the comments relating thereto made by Mr. P. J. Federico, the
Examiner in Chief in the Patent Office, who acted as an adviser of the drafting
commitee during the hearings on the bill, Hearings before Subcommittee No. 3 of the
Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 3760, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1951).
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of industry and the Department of Defense, voiced during the congressional hearings,4 the term "art" returned through the backdoor
of the definition section into the final form of the bill 44 and thus into
the law.
Of much greater significance than this change in phraseology is
the new statutory recognition that the invention or discovery of a new
use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter
or material may be patentable. Under the previously governing law,
especially in recent years, the courts had persistently refused to find
any legislative authority for mere "use-patents," particularly with
respect to compositions of matter, such as chemical substances. The
controlling line of cases-although foreshadowed by, and probably
isknown to
anchored in, an early decision by the Supreme Court --by
that
name"4
In
the
case
the
Thuau
doctrine.
the profession as
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals rejected patentability as a
"new therapeutic product for the treatment of diseased tissue" for a
known condensation product obtained by condensing metacresolsulfonic
acid with an aldehyde, although the court had to concede that the
inventor had "made a valuable discovery in the new use of the composition involved." The reason for the holding was not lack of inventiveness but the court's view that ".

.

. a patent for a new use

for an old substance quite unchanged is not authorized by the patent
laws because such use is not the invention or discovery of 'any new
and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement thereof' as required by . . .35
USCA § 31." 4
This rule, although approved by Judge Learned
43. See. the testimony given during the above-mentioned hearings by Mr. G. E.
Folk, Adviser to the Committee on Patents of N.A.M., Id. at 51, and by Capt. G. N.
Robillard, representing the Department of Defense, Id. at 78.
44. H.R. 7794; 82d Cong., 2d Sess. § 100(b) (1952). The report from the Committee on the judiciary, House of Representatives, which accompanied H.R. 7794,
failed, however, to comment on the re-inclusion of the term "art." H.R. REp. No.
1923. 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952).
45. Ansonia Brass & Copper Co. v. Electrical Supply Co., 144 U.S. 11 (1892).
In that case the Court denied the patentability of a method of insulating wires with
a non-combustible covering, because the method was not new although the inventor
had discovered its fireproof quality. In his opinion, Mr. Justice Brown stated:
".... nothing is better settled in this court than that the application of an old
process to a new and analogous purpose does not involve invention, even if the new
result had not before been contemplated."' Id. at 18. This statement was later
reiterated with approval in the frosted lamp bulb case, General Electric Co. v. Jewel
Co., 326 U.S. 242, 247 (1945). It must be noted, however, that in the Ansonia case
Mr. Justice Brown defined the crucial issue specifically as a "question of patentable
novelty" and one of "invention" rather than one of patentable subject matter as such
and that he conceded expressly that ".

.

. if an old device or process be put to a new

use which is not analogous to the old one, and the adaptation of such process to the
new use is of such a character as to require the exercise of inventive skill to produce
it, such new use will not be denied the merit of patentability." Ansonia Brass &
Copper Co. v. Electric Supply Co., supra at 18.
46. In re Thuau, 135 F.2d 344 (C.C.P.A. 1943).
47. Id. at 347 (Italics by the court).
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Hand 48 and followed by a series of judicial decisions,49 had been
criticized by text writers 0 and at least questioned on policy grounds
by the National Patent Planning Commission.51 A relaxation was
therefore to be expected.
Unfortunately the scope of the new code's recognition of use
patents is not as clear as might be desirable. It remains open to
doubt how far the section in question modifies or limits the Thuau
doctrine, although the new act certainly alters the statutory basis
of that decision. In the first place, it must be noted that while
the code refers to new uses of machines, compositions of matter and
material as well as of processes, the patentability of new uses seems
to be limited to process or method patents, and the Revision Notes
make it evident that the framers of the act intended such treatment of
use claims.52 As a matter of claim drafting it is therefore necessary
to protect the discovery of new uses by means of process or method
claims and not of product claims.5" In the second place, the background of the amendment gives reason to assume that a newly discovered use for a known substance, machine or process is still only
patentable if it is not merely analogous or cognate to the uses heretofore
made. On policy reasons it would be unfair to deprive a previous
inventor or the public of the benefits of a process, machine or product
merely because it has been discovered that such process, machine or
product possesses desirable qualities heretofore not apparent which
48. Old Town Ribbon & Carbon Co. v. Columbia Ribbon & Carbon Mfg. Co.,

159 F.2d 379 (2d Cir. 1947).

In that decision Judge Hand made it clear again that

the denial of the patentability of new uses was not based on the absence of invention

but on the lack of statutory authorization for use patents. Id. at 382.
49. Application of Hailer, 161 F.2d 280 (C.C.P.A. 1947) ; Application of Benner,
174 F.2d 938 (C.C.P.A. 1949); Merit Mfg. Co. v. Hero Mfg. Co., 185 F.2d 350

(2d Cir. 1950); Application of Craige, 188 F.2d 505 (C.C.P.A. 1951); Application

of Craige, 189 F.2d 620 (C.C.P.A. 1951); Application of Shackell, 194 F.2d 720

(C.C.P.A. 1952) ; Application of Rishoi, 197 F.2d 342 (C.C.P.A. 1952) ; Application
of Aronberg, 198 F.2d 840 (C.C.P.A. 1952).

50. Cf. Behrendt, The Place of a New Use in the Determination of Patent-

ability, 29 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 851 (1947); Wachsner, Patentability of New Uses,
34 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 397 (1952).
51. In its final report, the National Patent Planning Commission listed as one
of the problems which it had taken under consideration but had not fully investigated
prior to its sudden discharge: "Making possible the exploitation of so-called use

patents, that is patents involving mainly the use of unpatented materials . . ."
Third Report on the American Patent System, H.R. Doc. 283, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.
4 (1945).
52. See Revision Notes to Section 101, contained in the appendices to H.R. REP.
No. 1923 and SEN. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952): "The remainder of
the definition clarifies the status of processes or methods which involve merely the
new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or ma-

terial; they are processes or methods under the statute. .. ."
53. This is also the position of the Patent Office, see the report of a speech by
Mr. Federico, BULL. Am. PAT. L. Ass'N 107 (1953).
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warrant the intensification or expansion of the accepted use."4 Conversely, it should make no difference whether the new use relates to
a known process or to a known product. Intimations to the contrary
found in the case of United Mattress Machinery Co. v. Handy Button
Machine Co.55 reveal a perturbing misunderstanding of the act. Perhaps it is fair to state that in essence the new statutory definition of
"process" restores the broad principles of patentability flowing from a
careful analysis of the exposition given by the Supreme Court in the
Ansonia case discussed before.5"
It is perhaps worth noting that in liberalizing the scope of patentable inventions the American law has stayed with the trend of the
patent legislation of the other industrial powers. The new Patent
Act of the United Kingdom defines an invention broadly as "any
manner of new manufacture the subject of letters .

.

. patent within

section six of the Statute of Monopolies and any new method or
process of testing applicable to the improvement or control of manufacture. .

."

1

While the general part of the definition stems from

the Patents and Designs Act, 1907,5" the special recognition of the
testing and control processes was added by the reform of 1949 "
which also eliminated the formerly existing statutory restrictions upon
the patentability of chemical products and upon the scope of the patent
54. See the statements to that effect in Ansonia Brass & Copper Co. v.
Electrical Supply Co., 144 U.S. 11, 18 (1892); General Electric Co. v. Jewel Co.,
326 U.S. 242, 247 (1945).
55. 207 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1953). In that case Judge McLaughlin in commenting
on the scope of use patents stated: "Itwould seem, however, that process patents
may be granted for a new use in situations where products would not qualify....
The Act contains no comparable language respecting the new use of prior art products
as such." Id. at 5, n.4.
56. See note 45 supra.
57. Patents Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 GEo. 6, c. 87, § 101 (1).
58. Patents and Designs Act, 1907, 7 Emv. 7, c. 29, § 93. It may be mentioned
that Australia follows the British model and defines a patentable invention generally
as "any manner of new manufacture the subject of letters patent and grant of
privilege within section six of the Statute of Monopolies," Patents Act, No. 42 of
1952, § 6, while Canada and South Africa apply the American enumerative system.
The Canadian act lists as patentable inventions "any new and useful art, process,
machine, manufacture or compoosition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
in any art, process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter." Patent Act
of 1935, [1952] REV. STAT. OF CANADA c. 203, § 2(d) (1952). The new South African
definition reads: "'invention' means, subject to the provisions of this Act, any new and
useful art (whether producing a physic~l effect or not), process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter which is not obvious, or any new and useful improvement thereof which is not obvious, capable of being used or applied in trade or
industry, and includes any distinct and new variety of plant, other than tuberpropagated plant, which has been reproduced asexually, and any alleged invention."
South African Patents Act, No. 37 of 1952, § 1 (VI), [1952] STATUTES OF THE
UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA 199. For a comparative survey of the construction of these
definitions see Steyn, Proprietary Rights in Inventive Ideas and Discoveries, 70
So. Am'. L.J. 266 (1953).
59. The reasons for this addition are set forth by the Patent Law Reform
Committee in Patents and Designs Acts, Final Report of the Departmental Committee, CMD. No. 7206 at 28 et seq. 53 (1947).
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rights relating to substances intended for food or medicine.'
The
German Patent Act avoids any definition or enumeration of the subject
matter of patentable inventions and requires merely commercial exploitability. 6" In this connection, it might be pointed out particularly
that the practice in both Germany 62 and the United Kingdom ' recognizes the validity of patents for new uses of known contrivances,
products or processes, although, in those countries, too, adherence to
the requirement that the discovery of the new use be characterized by
inventive ingenuity intrinsically confines the field of such patents to
comparatively narrow limits.
Despite the extension of patentability to new uses of known processes, machines and materials it must not be concluded that the well
established rule which excludes the mere discovery of natural laws
and phenomena or the scientific explanation of the operation of known
devices or processes from the realm of patentable inventions has lost
its recognition. The Supreme Court has repeatedly invoked this
principle 64 and occasionally, as in the case of Funk Bros. Seed Co. v.
Kalo Inoculant Co.," has applied it in a manner which has met with
60. Introduced by the Patents and Designs Act, 1919, 9 & 10 GEo. 5, c. 80.
§38A. For the reasons which prompted the repeal of this provision see National
Patent Planning Comm'n, op. cit. supra note 51, at 21 et seq., 48.
61. Patents Act, 5 May 1936 (R.G. BL. pt. II, 117) § 1. The German law, however, specifically excludes product patents for foods and medicinal articles and substances produced by means of chemical reactions and permits only the grant of
process patents in these cases.
62. For the status of use-patents as recognized "patent-category" in German law
see 1 REIMER, PATENTGESETZ UND GESETZ BETREFFEND DEN SCHuTz VON GEBRAucHsmusTERN 84, 95 et seq. (1949).
63. For details concerning the law of the United Kingdom see MEINEARDT,
INVENTIONS, PATENTS AND MONOPOLY 64 (2d ed. 1950); TERRELL AND SHELLEY,
LAW OF PATENTS 123 (9th ed. 1951); 24 HALSBURY, LAWS op ENGLAND 554,
595 et seq. (2d ed., Lord Hailsham, 1937). One of the leading cases in the field
is Gadd & Mason v. Mayor, 67 L.T.R. 569, 9 T.L.R. 42 (C.A. 1892), in which a
patent was upheld for the adaptation to the construction of gasometers of a previously known method for floating docks and pontoons. The Canadian law follows
the British practice in recognizing use-patents. 1 Fox, CANADIAN LAW AND
PRacTicE RELATING TO LErrs PATENT FOR INVENTIONS 138 et seq. (3d ed. 1948);
but see id. at 57. Cognate to use-patents are the so-called "selection-patents" (in
Germany called "Auswahlpatente") in which the invention consists in the choice of
a particular member of a group of substances or processes, by reason of some special
and hitherto undetected properties of this member, for the achievement of a desired
result. They are likewise recognized in Germany, as well as in the United Kingdom.
1 RmEimmx,

PATENTGESETZ

UND

GEsETz BETREFFEND DEN ScHruTz VON GEmRaucHs-

(1949) ; 24 HALSBuRy, LAWS OF ENGLAND 600 (2d ed., Lord Hailsham,
1937). The Patent Law Reform Committee rejected proposals for a special legislative definition in these cases. Patent Law Reform Comm., op. cit. supra note 59,
at 29.
64. See Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156, 174, 175 (U.S. 1852); O'Reilly v.
Morse, 15 How. 62, 113 (U.S. 1853); DeForest Radio Co. v. General Electric Co.,
283 U.S. 664, 684 (1931); Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of America,
306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939) ; Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127,
130 (1948).
65. 333 U.S. 127 (1948). In that case the Court, with two justices dissenting,
invalidated product claims for an agriculturally important composite culture of
mutually compatible strains of Rhizobium bacteria, arrived at by deletion of mutually
MUSTERN 83

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

302

[Vol. 102

vigorous objections from the commentators. 6 It is again interesting
to observe that the American cases on this point are in accord with
the British and German practice although American patent law parlance does not differentiate carefully between "discovery" and "invention" as is customary in British, German and other European patent
terminology. 67 It seems safe, however, to predict that the rule that
mere scientific discoveries are not patentable will create some particularly difficult borderline questions in the recognition of patents for

new uses.
UTILITY AND NOVELTY

American patent law, like other patent law, requires as a condition
for the grant of a patent that the subject matter of the invention possess
utility and novelty. Both attributes have a technical character. The
framers of the new act, however, only felt a need for liberalization of
the latter concept.
Retention of the Decisional Interpretationof Utility
Like it predecessors, the new patent code refrains from defining
the concept of utility. According to the controlling case law,
however, an invention is held to be useful if it has a function
which by the accepted standards of society is considered beneinhibiting strains. The basic discovery consisted in the detection and isolation of the
mutually non-inhibitive strains. The methods for selecting these particular strains
and producing a bacterial culture followed well known laboratory procedures. Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority of the Court, reasoned that since the discovery of a natural phenomenon as such was not a patentable invention and since the
method of making use of it as such was not patentable for lack of novelty, the resulting product was likewise not entitled to patent protection.
66. See, for example, Patentability of Discovery of Principles of Nature: Funk
Bros. v. Kalo, 31 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 784 (1949); 33 MINN. L. REv. 430 (1949);
Notes, 27 TEX. L. 'REV. 265 (1948) ; 36 GEo. L.J. 703 (1948) ; Kip, Patentability of

Natural Phenomena, 20 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 371 (1952).
67. For the distinction between discovery and invention in British and Canadian
law see 24 HALsBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND 591 (2d ed., Lord Hailsham, 1937);
MEINHARDT, INVENTIONS, PATENTS AND MONOPOLY 48, 61 (2d ed. 1950); TERRELL
AND SHELLEY, LAW OF PATENTS 17 (9th ed. 1951); 1 Fox, THE CANADIAN LAW AND
PRACTICE RELATING To LETTERS PATENT FOR INVENTIONS 56 (3d ed. 1948). For the
same distinction in German law see IsAY, PATENTGESETZ 45 (5th ed. 1931);
SELIGSOHN, PATENTGESETZ 29 (7th ed. 1932) ; 1 REImER, PATENTGESETZ UND GESETZ
BETREFIEND DEN SCHUTZ VON GEBRAUcHSMUSTERN 41

(1949).

The French Patent

Act of 1844, while declaring every new discovery or invention in all branches of
industry as patentable (Art. 1), denies patent protection expressly to "theoretical
or purely scientific principles, methods, systems, discoveries and ideas, for which

industrial applications are not set forth."

(Art. 30) ; compare 1 CASALONGA, TRAIrA
68 ff. (1949). With respect to

TECHNIQUE ET PRATIQUE DES BREVETS D'INVENTION

the international efforts to secure legal protection for scientific discoveries and ideas

I CASALONGA, id. at 74 et seq.; HA-soN, PATENT RIGHTS FOR SCIENTIFIC Discovms (1930); Steyn, Proprietary Rights in Inventive Ideas and Discoveries, 70
So. AYR. L.J. 266 (1953).
see
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ficial and if it is capable of performing this function.6" Utility
thus possesses a social and a technical aspect. American law
agrees in this respect with that of other nations, as for instance Germany.6 9 The requisite practical operability, however, need not reach
the standard of perfection. It is sufficient that the subject of the
invention performs the specified function in a rudimentary fashion.
70
This is especially true where a basic or pioneer patent is in question.
Redefinition of Novelty
The concept of novelty on the other hand is the object
of a detailed statutory definition. 71 Novelty in the sense of
the patent law is not an absolute notion but is a term of art
which circumscribes the absence of certain factors and conditions
which the law considers to be anticipation of the invention and destructive of the quality of newness. Again the American law agrees generally in that respect with the law of other countries, 7 although the
68. See 1 WALKER,
69. Cf. 1 RmmiER,

PATENTS 310 (7th ed., Deller, 1937).
PATENTGESETZ UND GESETZ BETREFFEND DEN

SCHUTZ

VON

GEBRAUcHismUSTERN 62 (1949).

70. Hildreth v. Mastoras, 257 U.S. 27 (1921) ; see also The Telephone Cases, 126
U.S. 1, 536 (1888). Of course crude performance of the original invention will
facilitate the chances of obtaining patents for improvements. Eibel Process Co. v.
Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 63 (1923).
71. 66 STAT. 797, 35 U.S.C.A. §102 (Supp. 1952) provides:
"Conditions for patentability; novelty and loss of right to patent
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented
or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before
the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this
or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than
one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United
States, or
(c) he has abandoned the invention, or
(d) the invention was first patented or caused to be patented by the applicant
or his legal representatives or assigns in a foreign country prior to the
date of the application for patent in this country on an application filed
more than twelve months before the filing of the application in the United
States, or
(e) the invention was described in a patent granted on an application for
patent by another filed in the United States before the invention thereof
by the applicant for patent, or
(f) he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented, or
(g) before the applicant's invention thereof the invention was made in this
country by another who had not abandoned, suppressed or concealed it.
In determining priority of invention there shall be considered not only the
respective dates of conception and reduction to practice of the invention,
but also the reasonable diligence of one who was first to conceive and
last to reduce to practice, from a time prior to conception by the other."
72. See 1 Fox, THE CANADIAN LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO L=ns
PATENT FOR INVENTiONS 219 et seq. (1948) ; 1 REmMER, PATENTGESETZ UND GESEFZ
BETREFFEND DEN SCHUTZ VON GEBRAUcHsmusTERN 125 et seq. (1949); TERRELL
AND SHELLEY, LAw OF PATENTS 105 et seq. (9th ed. 1951).
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particular circumstances which determine the question of priority and
anticipation vary considerably from country to country.73
Most of the grounds which the new statutory catalogue lists as
destroying novelty were either explicitly recognized by the former
statute 74 or were developed by the adjudications of the Supreme Court.
Thus, the new § 102 (e) constitutes a codification of the rule laid down
in Milburn Co. v. Davis-Bournonville Co., 75 while the new § 102 (g)
casts into statutory language a rule which is the product of judicial
glosses enunciated on the basis of somewhat differently worded sections in the former law.7" The only real innovation is the provision 77
that a patent, secured by the applicant or his legal representatives or
assigns in a foreign country on an application filed more than twelve
months prior to the filing of the application in the United States,
destroys novelty of the invention only if such patent was actually
granted prior to the filing of the domestic application. In that respect
the law has been liberalized in favor of the inventor. 78
In addition to re-cataloguing and liberalizing the conditions which
destroy novelty and codifying the principles which determine priority
of invention ingeneral, the framers of the new act pruned and simplified
the provisions which control the effects upon the state of the prior
art produced by "knowledge or use. thereof, or other activity with
respect .

.

.

[to the invention] in a foreign country." 79

This

question had already called for special intervention by Congress in
1946 as result of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
73. Compare U.K. Patents Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 GEo. 6, c. 87, §§ 50-53,
32(1) (a), (e), (1), (2); Canadian Patent Act of 1935, [1952] Rav. STAT. OF
CANADA c. 203, 2§28, 29 (1952); Australian Patents Act, No. 42 of 1952, §§ 48(1),
(2), 158, with §§59, 100; South African Patents Act, No. 37 of 1952, § 1 (IX),
[1952] STATUTES OF THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRIcA 199; German Patent Act, 5 May
1936, as revised by act of 18 July 1953, § 2.
74. REv. STAT. §4886 (1875), as amended, 29 STAT. 692 (1897), 46 SlAT. 376
(1930), 53 STAT. 1212 (1939), 35 U.S.C. §31 (1946); Rav. STAT. §4887 (1875),
as amended, 29 STAT. 693 (1897), 32 STAT. 1225 (1903), 49 STAT. 1529 (1936), 53
STAT. 1212 (1939), 35 U.S.C. §32 (1946); REv. STAT. §4920 (1875), as amended,
29 STAT. 692 (1897), 53 STAT. 1212 (1939), 35 U.S.C. §69 (1946); REv. STAT.

4923 (1875), 35 U.S.C. §72 (1946).
75. 270 U.S. 390 (1926).

76. See Philadelphia & Trenton R.R. v. Stimpson, 14 Pet. 448, 462 (U.S. 1840);

Gayler v. Wilder, 10 How. 477, 496-98 (U.S. 1850); Coffin v. Ogden, 18 Wall.
120, 124-25 (U.S. 1873); Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U.S. 580, 592-94 (1881); The
Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1, 535 (1888); Milburn v. Davis-Bournonville Co., 270
U.S. 390, 399, 400 (1926); Corona Cord Tire Co. v. Dovan Chemical Corp., 276
U.S. 358, 382, 383 (1928); Radio Corp. v. Radio Engineering Laboratories, 293
U.S. 1, 11-14 (1934); Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. v. United States, 320 U.S.
1, 34, 35 (1943). See also 1 WALKER, PATENTS 377-96 (7th ed., Deller, 1937).
77. 66 STAT. 797, 35 U.S.C.A. § 102(d) (1952).
78. See the comments by Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives,
H.R. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952) and Revision Notes to Section 102, id.

at 17.
79. 66

STAT.

798, 35 U.S.C.A. § 104 (Supp. 1952).
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Electric Battery Co. v. Shimadzu.8" In that case the Court held that
the owner of an American patent for an invention made but not patented
abroad could enjoin the innocent use of the invention in the United
States by a manufacturer where such use antedated the application
for patent in the United States but was subsequent to the reduction
to practice of the invention abroad. At that time section 72 of the
patent law I provided in substance that a patent granted to an inventor
who at the time of the application believed himself to be the original
inventor of the thing patented should not be void because of prior
use or knowledge of the invention in a foreign country. The Court
construed this provision as not protecting an American inventor who
had neither applied for nor secured a patent and as thus exposing him
to priority claims by another inventor based on prior reduction to
practice of the invention achieved abroad. Congress proceeded to
remedy the situation by adding a new section to the patent law 82
which provided generally that use, knowledge or any activity with
respect to an invention in a foreign country should not be material
for the purpose of establishing the date of invention in proceedings in
the Patent Office or in the courts of the United States, except in the
instances where the patent law expressly accords foreign applications
parity with domestic ones. As a result the status of section 72 was
rendered extremely tenuous. If not repealed by implication it seemed
at least to have become "wholly unnecessary." " The new act therefore properly retains and incorporates 84 only the section which was
enacted in 1946 and excludes the more limited former section 72.
In addition, of course, the new patent law re-enacts 85 the rule--first
adopted in 1903 86 to comply with article 4 of Industrial Property
Convention of March 20, 1883, as amended by the additional act of
Brussels of December 14, 1900 "--which attributes to a foreign application the priority effects of a domestic application, where the

OF

80. 307 U.S. 5 (1939).
81. Rv. STAT. §4923 (1875), 35 U.S.C. § 72 (1946).
82. 60 STAT. 943, 35 U.S.C. § 109 (1946).
83. See the comments to that effect in PROPOSED REvIsION AND AMENDMENT
THE PATENT LAWS, PRELimiNARY DAFT WrrH NoTEs 13 (Committee on the

Judiciary, House of Representatives, Committee Print, (1950)).
84. 66 STAT. 798, 35 U.S.C.A. § 104 (Supp. 1952), based on 35 U.S.C. § 109

(1946). See text at note 82 supra.
85. 66 STAT. 800, 35 U.S.C.A. § 119 (Supp. 1952).
86. 32 STAT. 1226 (1903).

87. 32 STAT. 1936, 1939 (1903). The Convention of Union of Paris of March
20, 1883, For The Protection of Industrial Property, as amended, Brussels, Dec. 14,
1900, Washington, June 2, 1911, The Hague, November 6, 1925, London, June 2,
1934. For the text of the London revision which was ratified by the United States
in 1935 and especially the current form of Art. 4 regulating international priority

see 53

STAT.

1748, 1772 (1934).
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foreign country accords similar reciprocity and the earliest date of
such foreign application is not more than twelve months prior to the
filing of the application in the United States.
Stabilization of the Standard of Invention
According to a firmly established rule of American patent law
it is not sufficient for patentability that the process or product for
which such protection is claimed possesses novelty and usefulness.
In addition, it is necessary that such conception meets the "standard
of invention." S In that respect American patent law is in accord
with the laws of the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations
where either by statute or case law patent protection depends on the
presence of an "inventive step," 89 the patent law of Germany which
insists upon attainment of the "level of invention," 'o and the laws
of other countries.91
The formulation and application of the proper standard of invention had been the cause of great judicial pains and perplexity ever

since the highest tribunal started wrestling with the problem in the
early case of Hotchkiss v. Greenwood. 2 In that case, involving an
88. Representative is the statement by the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals in the recent case of Application of Neely, 205 F.2d 195, 197 (C.C.P.A.
1953), involving the invention of a garment envelope: "But novelty and usefulness
alone are not sufficient to support the allowance of the appealed claims. To be
allowable there must also be inventive subject matter in the claims."
89. The new Patents Act of the United Kingdom authorizes opposition to the
grant of a patent on the ground that the invention ".

.

. is obvious and clearly

does not involve any inventive step.... ." U.K. Patents Act, 1949, 12, 13 &
14 GEo. 6, c. 87, § 14(e), and also lists as ground for the revocation of a patent
and as defense in an infringement action that the invention ".

.

. is obvious and

does not involve any inventive step. . . ." Id. § 32()(f), (4). The necessity
of an inventive step, however, is dispensed with in the case of a mere "patent of
addition." Id. §26(7). Similarly the new Australian and South Africafi Patents
Acts subject a patent application to opposition and a granted patent to revocation on
the ground that the claimed invention is "obvious" and did not "involve an inventive
step," excepting again mere patents of addition, Australian Patents Act, No. 42 of
1952, §§59(1)(g), 100(1)(e), 76; South African Patents Act, No. 37 of 1952,
§§ 23(1) (d), 40, 43(1). For the decisional law in the United Kingdom and Canada
requiring and defining inventive ingenuity or skill, see 24 HALSBURY, LAWS OF
ENGLAND 593 (2d ed., Lord Hailsham, 1937); MEINHARDT, INVENTIONS, PATENTS
AND MONOPOLY 63 (2d ed. 1950); TERRELL AND SHELLEY, LAW OF PATENTS 120 (9th
ed. 1951); Fox, MONOPOLIES AND PATENTS, A STUDY OF THE HISTORY AND FUTURE
OF THE PATENT MONOPOLY 211, 248, 252, 255 (1947); 1 Fox, THE CANADIAN LAW
AND PRACTICE RELATING TO LETTERS PATENT FOR INVENTIONS 163 (3d ed. 1948).
90. About the concept and the necessity of the "level of invention" (Erfindungshoehe) see Lindenmaier, Zun Begriff der technischen Erfindung, 55 GEWERBL.
RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT
GESETZ BETREFFEND DEN SCHUTZ VON
PATENTGESETZ 38 (7th ed. 1932).

12 (1953);

I REIMER,
GEBRAUCHSMUSTERN 70

PATENTGESETZ UND
SELIGSOHN,

(1949);

91. In France the practice requires a "creation originale" or "id~e inventive." 1
TRAITt TECHNIQUE ET PRATIQUE DES BREVETS D'INVENTION 104 (1949) ;
see also Casalonga, De La notion d'"Erfindungshoehe" ou d'effort criateur en
CASALONGA,

France,

GEWERBL.

RECHITSSCHUTZ

NATiONALER TEl. 104 (1952).

92. 11 How. 248 (U.S. 1851).

UND

UREEBERRECHT,

AUSLANDS-UND

INTER-
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improved method of making door and other knobs, Justice Nelson
held that "unless more ingenuity and skill . . . were required in the
. . . [improvement of the prior art] than were possessed by an

ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absence
of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention." ' A quarter of a century later Mr. Justice
Hunt contrasted mere "mechanical skill" and "inventive genius" and
held that exercise of the former was not entitled to the protection of
the patent laws. 4 Again a few years later Mr. Justice Swayne, who
had struggled with the standard of invention once before,9 5 described
the mental. process which constitutes invention as a "flash of thought"
-a formulation which he quoted from a brief in the case-but hastened
to add "or .

.

. any exercise of the inventive faculty, more or less

thoughtful." 11 Gradually the court settled on the phrase "inventive
genius" as the test formula,9 7 until in the famous case of Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp. 8 Justice Douglas reached
the culmination of the semantic progression by declaring that "the
new device, however useful it may be, must reveal the flash of creative
genius, not merely the skill of the calling." 91 This rhetorical flourish
had the effect of a spark in a powder keg and the professional literature
became swamped with expressions of protest and anxiety.1 ° While
some subsequent opinions indicated that other members of the supreme
bench were not always willing to accept Justice Douglas' stringent
views as to patentability,"0 ' other decisions poured new oil onto the
93. Id. at 267.
94. Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92 U.S. 347, 357 (1876) (involving the validity of
a patent for the combination of a lead pencil and eraser).
95. Smith v. Nichols, 21 Wall. 112 (U.S. 1874) holding that "a patentable invention is a mental result" and that an improvement of an old invention is patentable
only if a new idea, distinct from the conception which preceded it, be engrafted
upon the old invention.
96. Densmore v. Scofield, 102 U.S. 375, 378 (1880).
97. See the cases collected by Justice Douglas in his dissenting opinion in
Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154 (1950).

98. 314 U.S. 84 (1941).
99. Id. at 91.
100. It would seem useless to list the numerous articles published as a result
of the Cuno case. Of the more recent writings see Dodds and Crotty, The New
Doctrinal Trend, 30 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 83 (1948) ; Pitt, Patent Law: "Invention,"
34 CoRN. L.Q. 663 (1949); Note, The Supreme Court and the "Standard of
Invention," 49 COL. L. P~v. 685 (1949) ; Gerhardt, Patent Policy and Invention, 46
ILL. L. REv. 609 (1951), 34 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 877 (1952); Prager, Standards
of Patentable Invention from 1474 to 1952, 20 U. OF CHi. L. REv. 69 (1952);
Kingsland, The Statutes and Decisions Presenting the Better Tests of Inventions,

34 J.

PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 473 (1952).
101. See Goodyear Co. v. Ray-O-Vac Co., 321 U.S. 275 (1944) and Sinclair
& Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327 (1945). In the latter opinion
Justice Jackson, commenting on the test of invention, observed that the patent
system "is not concerned with the quality of the inventor's mind, but with the

quality of his product."
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flames 102 and elicited the caustic comment from Mr. Justice Jackson
"that the only patent that is valid is one which this Court has not
been able to get its hands on." 103
It is therefore no wonder that industry and other interested pro.

fessional groups made sustained efforts to secure legislative relief from
the practical uncertainty and confusion which flowed from the "Patent
Office['s] passion for granting patents . . . [and the Supreme
Court's] equally strong passion . . . for striking them down." 104

This cleavage between the agency in charge of issuing patents and the
judiciary was particularly accentuated by the fact that American patent
law permits the lack of patentability to be raised as a defense in an
infringement suit without time limitation and makes the issue directly
cognizable by the courts. 5 The National Planning Commission
noted with alarm the "ever-widening gulf" between the Patent Office
and the courts and recommended as a promising remedy that Congress
enact a declaration of policy "that patentability be determined objectively by the nature of the contribution to the advancement of the art,
and not subjectively by the nature of the process by which the invention may have been accomplished." :06 In addition, the commission
considered "greater observance of the presumption of the validity of
patents to be another road to patent security." o Various bills in
the same vein were repeatedly introduced in Congress. 08
The new act follows these suggestions. Section 103 fixes an
objective standard of invention by specifying on the one hand that "a
patent may not be obtained .

.

. if the differences between the sub-

ject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the
subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
102. Especially Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560 (1949) and
Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950).
103. Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (dissenting
opinion by Justice Jackson).
104. Ibid.
105. German patent law entrusts the adjudication of actions for the annulment
of patents to the Patent Office, subject to judicial review. If the defendant in an
infringement suit wishes to attack the patent because of lack of patentable invention
the court cannot decide this issue but may only postpone its decision until the defendant has had opportunity to sue for annulment. But see 1 and 2 REimER,
PATENTGESETZ UND GESETZ BETREFFEND DEN SCHUTZ voxN GEBRAucHsmusTmEN 216,
569, 593, 594, 1052 (1949, 1950).
106. The American Patent System, H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 239, 78th Cong., 1st
Sess. 5,6 (1943). The Commission recommended further that the district courts in
infringement suits raising validity issues should secure an advisory opinion by the
Patent Office on those questions.
107. Third Report on The American Patent System, H.R. Misc. Doe. No. 283,
79th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1945).
108. For a list see PROPOSED REvISION AND AMENDMENT OF THE PATENT LAws
13 (Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Committee Print, 1950).
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invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to
which said subject matter pertains," and by declaring on the other
hand that "patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which
the invention was made." In addition, the new act elevates the
presumption of validity to the dignity of a statutory mandate. 109
Whether these provisions will have the desired "stabilizing
effect" o remains to be seen. So far the courts have taken the view
that the section in question "has apparently neither raised nor lowered
the standard of invention." "' This construction should not be questioned, especially in view of the fact that members of the Supreme
Court have presented their standard of invention as a constitutional
principle."12 Since in the words of Mr. Justice Jackson "the concept
of invention is inherently elusive" "' the broad negative test of "nonobviousness" can do little to afford a touchstone of invention." 4 Perhaps the most that can be said is that Congress has "expressed a
mood" "' and that it can be expected that both the Patent Officd
and the judiciary will do their best to respect it.
CLARIFYING AND STRENGTHENING THE PATENTEE'S RIGHTS

Nature and Scope of the Patent Right in General: Transferability
The new patent act incorporates a number of provisions designed
to codify and clarify the nature and scope of patent protection. In
general no substantive changes of the prior law were intended; the
framers merely sought to cast some judge-made rules into statutory
109. 66 STAT. 812, 35 U.S.C.A. §282 (Supp. 1952).
110. The report of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives,
accompanying the patent law bill made the following comment or) the proposed
section: "That provision paraphrases language which has often been used in decisions of the courts and the section is added to the statute for uniformity and

definiteness.

This section should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great

departures which have appeared in some cases .

H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82d

Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1952).
111. Application of O'Keefe, 202 F.2d 767 (C.C.P.A. 1953); accord, Stanley
Works v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 203 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1953); General Motors Corp.
v. Estate Stove Co., 203 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1953); New Wrinkle Inc. v. Watson,
204 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Thys Co. v. Oeste, 111 F. Supp. 665 (N.D. Cal.
1953). But see Gagnier Fibre Products Co. v. Fourslides Inc., 112 F. Supp. 926,
929 (E.D. Mich. 1953); see also Note, Judicial Comment om Sec. 103, New Patent
Act, BuLL. A-m. PAT. L. Ass'N 149 (1953).
112. See Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147,
154 (1950) (concurring opinion by Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Black).

113. Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 151
(1950).
114. See Galston, Invention and the "Obvious," 13 F.R.D. 463 (1953). It is
interesting to note in this connection that because of the intrinsic difficulties the
British Patent Law Reform Committee declined to recommend a statutory definition
of the requisite "inventive step," Final Report CaD. No. 7206 at 28 (1947).

115. To borrow an apt phrase coined by Justice Frankfurter in Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951).
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language and to correct some apparently misleading definitions of the
old law.
The Supreme Court had recognized long ago that "[t]he privileges granted by letters patent are plainly an instance of an incorporeal
kind of personal property." "I' The new act now expressly provides
that patents shall have the attributes of personal property."" While
even formerly there had been no doubt that the patent confers upon
the patentee the "exclusive property in the patented invention," 11 the
exact character of the powers thus conferred had been subject to ambiguity. The old patent law provided that a patent should contain
a grant . . . of the exclusive right to make, use, and vend
the invention or discovery. .
.. " "
But the Supreme Court had

found fault with this phrasing and pointed out that the Government
was not granting the patentee the common law right to make, use
and vend; that all that it conferred by the patent was the right to
exclude others from making, using or vending the invention.'
The
new act brings the statutori language into harmony with that analysis
and defines the patent as "a grant .

.

.

of the right to exclude others

from making, using or selling the invention." 121 One of the purposes
of this modification was to make it clear that the owner of a subservient patent could not exploit the invention without license from
the owner of the dominant patent, a principle long recognized by the
case law." m The famous though purely academic problem of whether
or not a patent confers a true monopoly I is left untouched by the
new act.
The new patent act has retained without material changes the
provisions of the former law relating to the assignability of applica116. De la Vergne Machine Co. v. Featherstone, 147 U.S. 209, 222 (1893).
117. 66 STAT. 810, 35 U.S.C.A. § 261 (Supp. 1952). The new Australian Patent
Act provides likewise that the rights granted by a patent are personal property,
Australian Patents Act, No. 42 of 1952, § 152(1) and the new act of the United
Kingdom contains a similar recognition, U.K. Patents Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 GEo.
6, c. 87, § 73(4).
118. James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 358 (1881).
119. REv. STAT. §4884, as amended, 46 STAT. 376 (1930), 35 U.S.C. §40 (1946).
120. Crown Die Co. v. Nye Tool Works, 261 U.S. 24, 35, 36 (1923).
121. 66 STAT. 804 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. §154 (Supp. 1952).
122. Smith v. Nichols, 21 Wall. 112, 119 (U.S. 1874); Temco Electric Motor
Co. v. Apco Mfg. Co., 275 U.S. 319, 328 (1928); United States v. Line Material
Co., 333 U.S. 287, 291 (1948).
123. While the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that "a patent confers a
monopoly," and has called the patentee's status a "statutory monopoly," Crown Die
Co. v. Nye Tool Works, 261 U.S. 24, 37 (1923); Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co.,
314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942); United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 308
(1948); Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 149
(1950), this analysis has occasionally been sharply repudiated by majority or dissenting opinions, United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933) ;
United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 328 (dissent by Justice Burton)
(1948).
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tions for patents, patents or any interest therein, and to the recognition
of grants and conveyances of exclusive rights under the applications
for patent or patents to the whole or any specified part of the United
States. 2=4 Consequently, American patent law has remained in harmony with the patent laws of other industrial nations which likewise
provide for total or limited assignments and encumbrances of patents,
as for instance the United Kingdom, France and Germany.'
Although the new American patent act, unlike that of the United Kingdom,' 28 has made no special provision for the recognition of equitable
interests in or charges upon patents, there is no doubt that the precedents in point ' 7 continue to control.
It should be noted in this connection that American case law has
traditionally differentiated sharply between assignments in the technical
sense of patent rights and mere grants of licenses. This distinction
has been particularly important in the determination of the indispensable, necessary or proper parties in cases involving actions to obtain
relief at law or in equity against infringement, 2 8 actions to obtain
declaratory or injunctive relief against threats of infringement suits, 129
and interference proceedings; ' but it has been invoked also for other
purposes, as for instance matters of taxation. 3 ' In the leading case
of Waterman v. Mackenzie,'3 2 Mr. Justice Gray laid down the following
tests and rules:
124. 66

STAT.

804, 35 U.S.C.A. § 152 (Supp. 1952); 66

§261 (Supp. 1952).

STAT.

810, 35 U.S.C.A.

Former provisions: Rv. STAT. § 4895 (1875), 35 U.S.C. § 44
(1946) ; REV. STAT. 4898 (1875), as amended, 29 STAT. 693 (1897), 42 STAT. 391
(1922), 55 STAT. 634 (1941), 35 U.S.C. §47 (1946).
125. See French Patent Act, July 5, 1844, § 20; German Patent Act, May 5,
1936, § 9; U.K. Patents Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 GEO. 6, c. 87, §§ 74, 21(1).
126. U.K. Patents Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 GEo. 6, c. 87 § 74(4).
127. E.g., Taylor Engines v. All Steel Engines, 192 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1951)
(applying the equitable principles of after-acquired title).
128. See- Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252 (1891); Pope Mfg. Co. v.
Gormully Mfg. Co., 144 U.S. 248 (1892); Crown Die Co. v. Nye Tool Works, 261
U.S. 24 (1923); Independent Wireless Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of America,
269 U.S. 459 (1926); United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476, 489
(1926) ; Western Electric Co. v. Pacent Reproducer Corp., 42 F.2d 116 (2d Cir.
1930) ; Hurd v. Sheffield Steel Corp., 181 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1950). See also Preload
Enterprises v. Pacific Bridge Co., 86 F. Supp. 976 (D. Del. 1949).
129. See A. L. Smith Iron Co. v. Dickson, 141 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1944); Hook
v. Hook & Ackerman, 187 F.2d 52 (3d Cir. 1951); Bendix Aviation Corp. v.
Kury, 88 F. Supp. 243 (E.D.N.Y. 1950); United Lacquer Mfg. Corp. v. Maas &
Waldstein Co., 111 F. Supp. 139 (D.N.J. 1953); Alamo Refining Co. v. Shell
Development Co., 99 F. Supp. 790 (D. Del. 1951). See also Note, Justiciable
Controversy Under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act and the Exercise of
Patent Rights, 22 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 63 (1953).
130. See Nachod & United States Signal Co. v. Automatic Signal Corp., 105
F.2d 981 (2d Cir. 1939); Klumb v. Roach, 151 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1945); Paper
Container Mfg. Co. v. Dixie Cup Co., 170 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1948).
131. See, e.g., Allen v. Warner, 190 F.2d 840 (5th Cir. 1951); Broderick v.
Neale, 201 F.2d 621 (10th Cir. 1953). But cf. Bloch v. United States, 200 F.2d
63 (2d Cir. 1952). See also Riddell, Patent Royalties as Capital Gains under I.R.C.
Section 117(a), 50 Micr. L. RFv. 991 (1952).
132. 138 U.S. 252, 255 (1891).
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"The patentee or his assigns may, by instrument in writing,
assign, grant and convey, either, 1st, the whole patent, comprising
the exclusive right to make, use and vend the invention throughout
the United States; or, 2d, an undivided part or share of that
exclusive right; or, 3d, the exclusive right under the patent
within and throughout a specified part of the United States. Rev.
Stat. § 4898. A transfer of either of these three kinds of interests
is an assignment, properly speaking, and vests in the assignee
a title in so much of the patent itself, with a right to sue infringers;
in the second case, jointly with the assignor; in the first and
third cases, in the name of the assignee alone. Any assignment
or transfer, short of one of these, is a mere license, giving the
licensee no title in the patent, and no right to sue at law in his
own name for an infringement. Rev. Stat. § 4919 [Case citations
omitted]. In equity, as at law, when the transfer amounts to
a license only, the title remains in the owner of the patent; and
suit must be brought in his name, and never in the name of the
licensee alone, unless that is necessary to prevent an absolute
failure of justice, as where the patentee is the infringer, and
cannot sue himself. Any rights of the licensee must be enforced
through or in the name of the owner of the patent, and perhaps,
if necessary to protect the rights of all parties, joining the
licensee with him as a plaintiff. Rev. Stat. § 4921 [Case citations
°
omitted].
"Whether a transfer of a particular right or interest under
a patent is an assignment or a license does not depend upon the
name by which it calls itself, but upon the legal effect of its
provisions."
This strict test by which a true assignment conferring "title"
is present only if the grantee has the exclusive threefold right of
making, using and vending the patented invention, at least in a particular territory, has never been questioned by subsequent cases. But
the field thus left to licenses covers a multitude of different arrangements, ranging from a mere nonexclusive license conferring the privilege to make or use or vend the invention with the attendant "immunity" from an infringement suit 13 to an "exclusive" license which,
though "short of a true assignment," gives the licensee rights "far
more extensive than those remaining in the inventor." 134 Consequently, the courts have come to limit and relax the stringent procedural rules of the Waterman case. In addition to the exceptions listed
in that case itself, the Supreme Court subsequently has permitted an
exclusive licensee to bring suit in his own name to enjoin infringement
133. See, e.g., General Pictures Co. v. Western Electric Co., 304 U.S. 175, 181
(1938).
134. Nachod & United States Signal Co. v. Automatic Signal Corp., 105 F.2d
981, 983 (2d Cir. 1939) (comment to that effect by Judge A. Hand).
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of the patent by a stranger, provided that he has joined the patent
owner as co-plaintiff either with his consent or, if he is outside the
jurisdiction, without it, or as defendant, if he refuses to join as
plaintiff but can be served with process."3 5 The court has also apparently been inclined to recognize that the reason for the denial of
an independent infringement action or of a joinder in such action to
nonexclusive licensees is not so much the idea of title or the wording
of the patent law as the need of protecting the alleged infringer against
the harassment and danger of an excessive recovery inherent in a
multitude of suits or claims.'3 6 The lower federal courts, stimulated
by the adoption of the federal rules of civil procedure, '3 7 have likewise exhibited a tendency toward flexibility and liberalization, noticeable especially, though not alone, in cases involving declaratory relief
against threats by licensees and interference proceedings. 8' While
the new patent act has repealed the former complex provisions which
regulated separately relief at law and in equity in cases of infringement,1' and now simply accords "remedy by civil action for infringement" to the "patentee" and "his successors in title," 140 it is believed
that no material change in the law has been accomplished. Sound
policy would require an exclusive licensee to be considered a real
party in interest in an infringement suit, entitled to act at least as
co-plaintiff with the holder of the title.
It is doubtful that American lawyers will derive comfort from
the fact that in other laws also the status of the so-called exclusive
licensee has created difficulties. The new Patents Act of the United
Kingdom contains a specific definition of the term exclusive licensee 141
135. See Independent Wireless Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 269

U.S. 459 (1926).
136. See Taft, C. J., in Independent Wireless Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of
America, 269 U.S. 459, 468 (1926) and Frankfurter, J., in Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Wodehouse, 337 U.S. 369, 419 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
137. Especially FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a), 19(a), (b) and 20(a).
138. See Western Electric Co. v. Pacent Reproducer Corp., 42 F.2d 116 (2d
Cir. 1930) (defining exclusive licensee for purposes of joinder in an infringement
suit) ; Nachod & United States Signal Co. v. Automatic Signal Corp., 105 F2d 981
(2d Cir. 1939) (holding that an exclusive licensee is an indispensable party in an
interference process); Paper Container Mfg. Co. v. Dixie Cup Co., 170 F.2d 333
(3d Cir. 1948) (holding that mortgagor is real party in interest in an action to
obtain a patent involved in interference); United Lacquer Mfg. Corp. v. Maas
& Waldstein Co., 111 F. Supp. 139 (D.N.J. 1953) (holding that the owner of a
patent is a necessary but not indispensable party in a suit for declaratory relief
against exclusive licensee claiming infringement by plaintiff).
139. Ray. STAT. §4919 (1875), 35 U.S.C. §67 (1946) ; REv. STAT. §4921 (1875),

as amended, 29
(1946).

STAT.

694 (1897). 42

STAT.

392 (1922), 60

STAT.

778, 35 U.S.C. § 70

140. 66 Stat. 797, 812, 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 100d, 281 (Supp. 1952).
141. U.K. Patents Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 GEo. 6, c. 87, § 101(1) : "'Exclusive
license' means a license from a patentee which confers on the licensee . . . to the
exclusion of all other persons (including the patentee), any right in respect of the
patented invention, and 'exclusive licensee' shall be construed accordingly. .. ."
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and entitles him expressly to bring infringement suits in his own name,
These provijoining the patentee either as plaintiff or defendant."
sions were intended to liberalize the strictness of the prior case law,I4
but it is obvious that the term "exclusive licensee" is still rather
narrowly defined. In France, the situation is likewise quite complex.
While even an exclusive licensee is not entitled to sue for infringement, such relief is available if the arrangement is in reality a "disguised assignment." I"
Recognition and Definition of Contributory Infringement; Limitation
of the Misuse Doctrine
Perhaps the most significant innovation made by the new patent
act is the statutory recognition and definition of the concept of contributory infringement and the act's attempt to check the corrosion
which the ever expanding doctrine of patent misuse had produced on
that notion.
American courts at a comparatively early date developed the
principle that a patentee was entitled to relief against a third person
not only if the latter had technically infringed upon a patent claim
by practicing the invention in question without license, but also if he
had merely supplied an unpatented machine or article to be used by
another in the infringing manufacture of a patented combination or
the infringing application of a patented process.' 45 The Supreme
Court finally put its stamp of approval on this doctrine of contributory
infringement by first adhering to it in substance "' and later by
adopting it by name. 147 In that respect the American development
finds a striking parallel in Germany where the courts likewise have
come to recognize a similar idea. 4 '
142.. U.K. Patents Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 GEo. 6, c. 87, § 63.
143. See Renard v. Levinstein, 2 Hem. & M. 628, 71 Eng. Rep. 607 (Ch. 1865);
Heap v. Hartley, 42 Ch. Div. 461 (C.A. 1889) ; Scottish Vacuum Cleaner Co., Ltd.
v. Provincial Cinematograph Theatres, Ltd. [1915] 1 Scots L.T. 389 (Outer House).
144. For details see 1 CASALONGA, TRAITr TECHNIQUE ET PRATIQUE DES BREVETS
D'INVENTION 431 et seq. (1949) ; 2 id. at 84 et seq.
145. The doctrine of contributory infringement is believed to have originated
in the case of Wallace v. Holmes, 29 Fed. Cas. 74 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871). The term
itself appears for the first time in a decision in Snyder v. Bunnell, 29 Fed. 47
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886). A subsequent milestone in the judicial path of the doctrine
was the opinion of Judge Taft in Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Ohio Brass
Co., 80 Fed. 712 (6th Cir. 1897). For details, see Roberts, Contributory Infringement of Patent Rights, 12 HARv. L. REV. 35 (1898); Rich, Contributory Infringement, 31 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 449 (1949).
146. Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106 U.S. 89, 94 (1882).
147. Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Machine Co. (No. 2), 213 U.S.
325, 333 (1909). Mr. Justice Brewer in Cortelyou v. Johnson & Co., 207 U.S. 196,
199 (1907) used the term "indirectly infringing."
148. In Germany the idea of contributory infringement, called "mittelbare
Patentverletzung," was first judicially recognized by the Supreme Court in a 1927
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The scope of the doctrine of contributory infringement, however,
underwent vast vacillations, owing principally to the fact that in a certain sense it constituted a judicial extension of the patent "monopoly."
The patentee's protection under this doctrine reached its high watermark in 1912 with the Supreme Court's decision in Henry v. Dick
Company 14 9 in which the Court held that where a patented machine
was sold to a customer subject to a notice of restriction attached to
the machine permitting it to be used only with unpatented supplies
bought from the patentee, a sale of such articles by a third person
with the knowledge that they would be used in violation of said restriction constituted contributory infringement. The Court differentiated
prior decisions to the effect that a sale of a patented article placed
the same outside the limits of the patent monopoly 5 0 by insisting
that this principle applied only to unconditional sales. The Court
declared that a stipulation qualifying the right of use in a machine
sold subject thereto had the effect that a breach would not only give
rise to a right of action upon contract,15 ' but "would be at the same
time an act of infringement, giving to the patentee his choice of
remedies." 152
In the very next year, however, the Court began to recede from
its broad conception of the patent monopoly and to whittle down the
generous protection against infringement and contributory infringement. .The new trend began with a decision which withheld the
cloak of the patent monopoly from measures designed for resale price
maintenance and denied that a retailer was liable for infringement
for having sold a patented chemical at a price lower than the resale
price specified by the manufacturer in a "notice to the retailer" printed
on the package.' 5 The Court reaffirmed its attitude four years later
when it failed to condone an evasion of its ruling attempted by resort
to a resale price maintenance scheme which disguised retail sales as
licensing agreements.' 54 On the same day on which this decision was
decision and was subsequently developed and extended in a number of other opinions
by that tribunal, e.g., I. G. E. v. M. & Co., German Supreme Court, Nov. 10,
1928, 122 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES RRICHSGERICHTS IN ZIVILSACHEN [hereinafter
R.G.Z.] 243; H. v. N'sche Gummiwarenfabrik Gmbh., German Supreme Court,
Oct. 14, 1931, 133 R.G.Z. 326; K. v. D. AB., German Supreme Court, July 8, 1933,
141 R.G.Z. 336. See 1 REME, PATENTGESETZ UND GESETZ BErREFFEND DEN SCHUTZ
vON GEBRAucHsmusTERN 309 et seq. (1949).
149. 224 U.S. 1 (1912).
150. Adams v. Burke, 17 Wall. 453 (U.S. 1873); Keeler v. Standard Folding
Bed Co., -157 U.S. 659 (1895).
151. This had been recognized in Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70
(1902).
152. Henry v. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 31 (1912).
153. Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 8 (1913).
154. Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 243 U.S. 490 (1917).
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announced, the Court handed down another opinion which expressly
declared that the decision in Henry v. Dick Company must be regarded
as overruled. In that latter case, Motion PicturePatents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co.,"5 it was held that the monopoly granted by the patent
laws did not authorize the patentee "to prescribe by notice attached
to a patented machine the conditions of its use and the supplies which
must be used in the operation of it, under pain of infringement" by
a purchaser or the purchaser's lessee. 5
The Court buttressed its
redefinition of the scope of the patent monopoly by adverting to the
fact that since the Dick case Congress, "as if in response to that
decision," had passed the Clayton Act 5 and thus had given a most
persuasive expression of public policy with respect to the proper scope
of patent protection. 5 ' The Court confined its decision expressly
to the operation of patent protection and left the matter of contractual
remedies open to subsequent consideration.'"
On the doctrinal ground thus prepared by the Motion Picture
Patents Co. case, the Supreme Court erected a rapidly expanding
theory of monopolistic patent misuse which not only entailed the specific
legal sanctions imposed by the antimonopoly legislation '10 but also
resulted in the invalidity, as a matter of both patent and contract law,
of the respective agreements.:"' In addition, this theory was apt to
deprive the patentee of his otherwise available protection through in155. 243 U.S. 502, 518 (1917).
156. Id. at 509.
157. Applicable section: 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1946).
158. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502,
517 (1917).
159. Id. at 509.
160. Cases involving a direct application of the antimonopoly laws as a result
of restrictive practices based on arrangements involving patents are, e.g., Standard
Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20 (1912); United Shoe Machinery
Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922); Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931) ; International Business Machines Corp. v.
United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936) ; Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309
U.S. 436, 455 (1939); United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942);
United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942) ; International Salt Co. v.
United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S.
287 (1948); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948);
United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371 (1952).
161. See, e.g., Boston Store v. American Graphophone Co., 246 U.S. 8 (1918)
(price fixing agreements relating to patented articles are void as contrary to the
general law and not actionable in federal courts even in diversity cases) ; Carbice
Corp. of America v. American Patents Development Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931)
(condition in a license for the use of a patented container which requires that unpatented merchandise to be placed therein must be purchased from the exclusive
licensee for the manufacture of such container will not be unenforceable as a matter
of patent law) ; Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938) (license for the
use of a patented process cannot be conditioned upon use only with non-patented
materials bought from patentee).
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junctive relief 162 and to subject him to compulsory licenses." s The
Supreme Court, however, has, at least for the present, still excepted from
the sweep of its "monopolistic misuse" doctrine, the right of the patentee
to grant licenses for the manufacture and sale of patented articles
164
upon the agreement by the licensee to observe prescribed resale prices,
or upon the condition that the licensee restrict his sales to certain
classes of users. 6 5 In the later case a violation of such condition was
held to constitute infringement not only by the licensee but also by a
purchaser with knowledge.' 6 6
Of course, a great deal of the success of the misuse doctrine was
at the expense of the doctrine of contributory infringement. The
latter was designed to protect the patentee or exclusive licensee against
third parties furnishing unpatented materials known to be used in an
infringement by the purchasers. Thus the policy of invalidating conditions in use licenses which required unpatented materials used with
the patented invention to be purchased from the licensor or specified
suppliers, of necessity curtailed the field of contributory infringement,
and gave third party suppliers the liberty of ignoring such restrictions
without danger of being subject to such suit. The earlier decisions
denying relief against contributory infringement in these cases involved the supply of some "unpatented staple article of commerce" 167
used either in the employ of patented articles, 6" or as supply with
162. See, e.g., Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942) (denial
of injunctive relief against infringement of patented apparatus, where patentee had
abused his patent monopoly by using it through tying clauses as a means of restraining competition with its sale of an unpatented article) ; B. B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis,
314 U.S. 495 (1942) (extending the principle of the Morton Salt Co. case to process
patents).
163. See, e.g., the principles laid down in the cases of Hartford-Empire Co. v.
United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945) ; United States v. National Lead Co., 332
U.S. 319 (1947); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947);
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76 (1950) ; Besser Mfg.
Co. v. United States, 343 U.S. 444 (1952).
164. United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
This decision was expressly reserved from being overruled and distinguished in United
States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 277 (1942) ; United States v. Line Material
Co., 333 U.S. 287, 299 (1948) ; United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371,
378 (1952). The effect of a breach is, however, open to conjecture.
165. General Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., 304 U.S. 175 (1938).
166. In that respect American patent law coincides with the legal system of the
United Kingdom and Germany which likewise attribute the sanction of infringement
to limitations and conditions in licenses which are consistent with public policy and
not specifically proscribed. See 24 HALsBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND 715 (2d ed., Lord

Hailsham, 1937); MEINHARDT, INVENTIONS, PATENTS AND MONOPOLY 156 (2d ed.
1950) ; TERRELL AND SHELLEY, LAW OF PATENTS 262, 264 (9th ed. 1951) ; 1 RErmER,
PATENTGESETZ UND GESETZ BETREFFEND DEN

SCHUTZ

VON

GEBRAUCHSMUSTERN

384,

387 (1949).
167. Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458, 460 (1938).
168. Carbice Corp. of America v. American Patents Development Corp., 283
U.S. 27 (1931).
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70
patented machines, 16 or as starting material in a patented process.
But in the famous Mercoid cases '7 the Supreme Court went a step
further. In the first of these cases, the Court denied relief for contributory infringement to the exclusive licensee of a combination or
system patent who had sublicensed the use of the system on the condition that an unpatented element of the system-a particular control
switch-be purchased from him.' 72 In the second case, the court
denied relief for direct and contributory infringement to the owner
of a system patent who had licensed certain competitors to manufacture and vend three unpatented switches which constituted an essential
element of the patented system and who had granted licenses for the
use of the patent only to purchasers of the switches from one of these
manufacturers 78
Justice Douglas, who authored the controlling
opinions, commented in the course of one of them: "The result of
this decision . . . is to limit substantially the doctrine of contrbutory infringement. What residuum may be left we need not stop to
consider." -74
Alarm over the doubt thus cast upon the vitality of the whole
doctrine of contributory infringement 5 and fear of further extensions
of the misuse doctrine, which were accentuated by holdings or dicta
in some decisions of the lower federal courts rendered in the wake of
the Mercoid cases, 7 6 led to a clamor for legislative relief. The New
York Patent Law Association sponsored a bill for the restoration of
protection against contributory infringement, which was prepared
in the committee on patent law and practice of the association, and

169. International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 136
(1936).
170. Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938).
171. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944);
Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944).
172. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
173. Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S.
680 (1944). It is interesting to observe that the four justices, who had dissented in
the Mid-Continent case, felt that the facts in the instant case were sufficiently
different to compel them to concur in the result reached by the majority.
174. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661, 669 (1944).
175. See Wood, The Tangle of Mercoid Case Implications, 13 GEo. WAsH. L.
REv. 61 (1944), 27 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 230 (1945); Mathews, Contributory In-

fringement and the Mercoid Case, 27 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 260 (1945); Palmer,
Contributory Infringement Since the Mercoid Cases, 29 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 699
(1947) ; Rich, Contributory Infringement, 31 1. PAT. OFF. Soe'y 449 (1949) ; Knoth,
Contributory Infringement: R.I.P., 31 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 767 (1949).
But see
Robertson, Rational Limits of Contributory Infringement, 33 J. PAT. OrFF. SocY 857
(1951).
176. Landis Machinery Co. v. Chaso Tool Co., 141 F.2d 800 (6th Cir. 1944);
Lempco Products, Inc. v. Simmons, 140 F.2d 58 (6th Cir. 1944). See also Strocco
Products v. Mullenback, 67 U.S.P.Q. 168 (S.D. Cal. 1944); Jacquard Knitting
Machine Co. v. Ordnance Gauge Co., 108 F. Supp. 59 (E.D. Pa. 1952); Kobe, Inc.
v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1952).
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had it introduced in the Eightieth and the Eighty-first Congresses. 17
The bill was the subject of extensive hearings 178 but failed to pass.
The framers of the new patent act, however, incorporated the contributory infringement bill, with slight alterations in phraseology, in
their first revision bill 179 and, with further changes in wording, in
their subsequent bills.""0 Thus, eventually it became a part of the
new code, despite the objections which the Department of Justice
had raised throughout the various hearings."" 1
The new patent law defines as contributory infringement the sale
of "a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination
or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a
patented process, constituting a material part of the invention," if
the seller knows that the object sold is "especially made or especially
adapted for use in an infringement of such patent" and excludes
specifically the sale of "a staple article or commodity of commerce
suitable for substantial noninfringing use. .

"

182

The seller

of so-called neutral articles is consequently protected against the danger
of liability for contributory infringement. His position is similar under
8
German law.f

3

Joined with this re-establishment of a legitimate area for the doctrine of contributory infringement is a further provision 184 which is
designed to assure that certain acts by the patentee will not be held' to
constitute a misuse or illegal extension of the patent right. It is expressly declared that a patent owner shall not be denied relief for infringement or contributory infringement "by reason of his having done
one or more of the following: (1) derived revenue from acts which
if performed by another without his consent would constitute contributory infringement of the patent; (2) licensed or authorized another
177. H.R. 5988, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948); H.R. 3866, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.

(1949).

178. Hearings before Sub.committee on Patents, Trade-Marks and Copyrights
of the Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 5988, H.R. 4061 and H.R. 5248, 80th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1948) ; Hearings before Subcommittee No.4 of the Committee oM

the Judiciary, on H.R. 3866, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1950).

As stated by Mr. Rich

in the latter hearings, he and Messrs. Walker and Byerly of the New York Bar were
the three principal authors of the bill. Id. at 2.
179. H.R. 9133, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., §231(c)-(g) (1950).
180. H.R. 3760, 82d Cong., Ist Sess., § 231(b) -(d) (1951); H.R. 7794, 82d

Cong., 2d Sess., §271(b)-(d) (1952).

181. See Hearings on HR. 5988, supra note 177, at 68; Hearings on H.R. 3866,

supra note 177, at 52; Hearings before Subcommittee No. 3 of the Committee on the
Judiciary on H.R. 3760, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 162, 207 (1951).
182. 66 2STAT. 811, 35 U.S.C.A. §271c (Supp. 1952). About the legislative
history of

§ 71(c) see Rich, Infringement under Section 271 of the Patent Act of

1952, 35 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 476, 493 (1953).
183. See 1 REimFR, PATENTGESETZ ND

GESETZ BETREFFEND DEN SCHUTZ VON

GEBRAucHsusTmRN 313-15 (1949).

184. 66 STAT. 811, 35 U.S.C.A. §271d (Supp. 1952).
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to perform acts which if performed without his consent would constitute contributory infringement of the patent; (3) sought to enforce his
patent rights against infringement or contributory infringement." The
exact import that the courts will attribute to this subsection, which is
shrouded in unnecessarily obscure and mysterious phraseology, is hard
to predict. It baffled various witnesses who testified with respect
thereto in the congressional hearings, 85 and perplexed commentators
who dealt with it subsequent to the passage of the act.186 Even one
of the three principal authors of the original draft of this subsection,
which has remained unchanged in the material portions through all
the legislative stages, seemingly has made conflicting and inaccurate
statements regarding the types of situations which the first two of the
three statutory categories of sanctioned activities were meant to embrace.'8 7 Perhaps it is safe to assume that the courts will respect the
apparent intent of the originators of this subsection and, accordingly, hold that a patentee or an exclusive licensee who manufactures and sells, or licenses the manufacture and sale of, a special
though unpatented device or compound, chiefly useful only as a component of a patented combination or composition or for use with a patented process, will be permitted to protect himself against competition
in the sale of these articles through appropriate limitations upon the
use-licenses of the ultimate customers. In other words, the Mercoid
cases no longer represent the law, Leeds & Catlin (No. 2)188 has been
restored, at least within limits, but Carbice Corp. v. American Patents
185. See, e.g., the comment by Mr. Hackley, Chief of the Patent Section, De. section 5 of the
partment of Justice, before a House Subcommittee in 1948: ".
bill, as it is understood, is disapproved in that, if it means anything [1] it seems to
negate much of the existing body of case law which has operated to prevent
illegal extension of the patent grant ... " Hearings on H.R. 5988, supra note 177,
at 69.
186. See Clapp, Some Recent Developments in Patent-Antitrust Law, 36 MARQ.
L. Rxv. 143 (1952), 34 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 945 (1952); Rich, Infringement under
Section 271 of the Patent Act of 1952, 35 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 476 (1953) ; Note, Contributory Infringement and Misuse-The Effect of Section 271 of the Patent Act of
1952, 66 HARv. L. Rxv. 909 (1953).
187. Mr. Rich, one of the three authors of the subsection in question (see note
177 supra) testified in 1949 that H.R. 3866, § 5(a), which has become §271 (d)(1),
referred to cases like the Lamp case (see note 45 supra) or the Mercoid case (see
note 170 supra) where the patentee has been in the business of selling less than the
entire invention claimed and has been making a profit out of it; while H.R. 3866
§ 5(b), which has now become § 271(d) (2), referred to situations like the Mercoid
situation in which the patentee licensed people to make switching units which had
no other use except in the case of this invention. Hearings on H.R. 3866, supra
note 177, at 14. But in 1951 Mr. Rich took the view that § 271(d) (1) referred to
situations such as that in the Barber Asphalt case (see note 169 supra), while
§ 271(d) (2) covered the Mercoid type of situation. Hearings on H.R. 3760, supra
note 180, at 174. Actually, beth subsections use narrower language than would
be necessary to immunize the situations involved in the Mercoid cases.
188. Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Machine Co. (No. 2), 213 U.S. 325
(1909).
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Developments Corp., Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., Morton Salt Co. v.
Suppiger Co., and B. B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis... continue unimpaired.
Continued Absence of Express Provisions for Compulsory Licenses
It is noteworthy that the new American patent act has maintained
the silence of the former legislation with respect to the grant of compulsory licenses. The patent laws of many other industrial nations contain
more or less elaborate provisions for the imposition of compulsory
licenses, especially in cases where the patentee fails to exploit the patented invention commercially for a prolonged period, or where he refuses a license on reasonable terms to the owner of a dependent patent,
or where the patent relates to food or medicinal preparations. In most
instances, compulsory licenses may be decreed only after the expiration
of three years from the issuance of the patent because of the restriction
to that effect contained in the Convention of Union for the Protection
of Industrial Property. 9 ' Thus the Swiss patent act authorizes the
grant of a compulsory license to any interested party three years after
the issuance of the patent where the patented invention has not been
sufficiently exploited in Switzerland and the patentee cannot justify such
failure, or where a compulsory license is demanded by he public interest. 1' The act also authorizes the grant of a compulsory license to the
owner of a dependent patent needing a license from the dominant patentee where the second invention represents a notable technical advance
and the three years have elapsed. 9 ' The patent laws of Canada and the
new acts of the United Kingdom, Australia and South Africa contain
detailed though somewhat varying catalogues of conditions under
which compulsory licenses may be imposed, 19 3 generally but not in all
cases after the expiration of the requisite three years from the sealing
of the patent. Failure to practice the invention commercially in the
country so as to meet domestic demands and benefit the local economy,
refusal to grant licenses to the prejudice of domestic trade and industry, and the insertion of unfair and prejudicial restrictions in licenses
189. Cases cited notes 161 and 162 supra.
190. Art. 5 of the International Convention, as revised at London, June 2,
1934, authorizes the member states "to take the necessary legislative measures to
prevent abuses which might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent; for example, failure to use." 53 STAT. 1768, 1774 (1934). But
it requires the expiration of a three-year period from the issuance of the patent prior
to the imposition of compulsory licenses. Id. at 1775.
191. Swiss Patent Act, June 21, 1907, Art. 18, Art. 22 bis.
192. Swiss Patent Act, June 21, 1907, Art. 18.
193. Patent Act of 1935, [1952] R1v. STAT. OF CANADA c. 203, §§41(3),
67(2)(a)-(f); U.K. Patents Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14, GEO. 6, c. 87, §§37(2) (a)(e); 40(3); 41(1); Australian Patents Act, No. 42 of 1952, §§108, 110(1)(a)(d) ; South African Patents Act, No. 37 of 1952, §§48(1), 49, 50(1), 50(6) (a)-(f).
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granted are the principal reasons for such action. The United Kingdom
and South Africa make an additional express provision for the benefit of
the owner of a dependent patent which represents a substantial advance
in the art.194 The German patent act contains a general clause providing for compulsory licenses, if such grant is in the public interest and
the requisite three year period has elapsed.' 95
In contrast to this policy of foreign patent laws, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly affirmed that the American patent entitles the owner
". .. to use it himself and refuse to license it, or to retain it and neither
use nor license it." 198 As a result, nonuse is not a defense in an infringement action "I and cross-licensing between the owners of dominant and dependent patents will not be judicially compelled, although
cross-licensing as such is looked upon with judicial favor. 9 American
courts have devised and applied the sanction of compulsory licenses only
in cases of actual violations of the antimonopoly laws.'99 It is perhaps
regrettable that the drafters of the new code have closed their ears even
to the very moderate proposals for compulsory licenses in the fields of
public health and public safety advanced by the National Patent Planning Commission.

2

00

194. U.K. Patents Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Go. 6, c. 87 §37(2) (d); South
African Patents Act, No. 37 of 1952, §49.
195. German Patent Act, May 5, 1936, as revised July 18, 1953, § 15. For the
case law interpreting this section, see 1 REIMER, PATENTGESETZ uND GESETZ
BETREFFEND DEN SCHUTZ VON GEBRAUCHSMUSTERN

621 (1949).

196. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 417 (1945), relying
on Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 424 (1908) ;
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 510, 514
(1917); and Crown Die Co. v. Nye Tool Works, 261 U.S. 24, 34 (1923). Special
Equipment Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 378, 379 (1945). See also Stemple, Nozuser of
Paper Patents, 34 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 23 (1952).
197. Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908).
198. See Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787 (1876) ; Cantrell v. Wallick, 117
U.S. 689, 694 (1886); Temco Electric Motor Co. v. Apco Mfg. Co., 275 U.S. 319,
328 (1928) ; United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 291, 311 (1948).
199. Cases cited note 163 supra.
200. National Patent Planning Comm'n, The American Patent System, H.R.
Misc. Doc. No. 239, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1943).

